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Abstract
This paper shows that an equilibrium model in which heterogeneous households face
housing collateral constraints can quantitatively replicate the cross-sectional variation
in risk premia on stock portfolios sorted by book-to-market value. A value premium
arises because (1) cash °ows to growth stocks are situated farther into the future than
the cash °ows on value stocks, and (2) claims to farther-out cash °ows are less risky
because they are only subject to low-frequency housing collateral shocks and not to
temporary consumption growth shocks. In contrast to many other equilibrium asset
pricing models, our model endogenously generates a downward sloping term structure
of equity risk premia; a necessary condition for a value premium (Lettau and Wachter,
2006). Our calibration shows that we not only generate the right sign, but also the
right magnitude for the returns spread between value and growth stocks.
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The canonical consumption-based asset pricing model of Breeden (1979) and Lucas (1978)
implies small and roughly constant equity risk premia over time and little or no risk premium
variation in the cross-section. Yet, recent research in empirical asset pricing has documented
striking di®erences in risk premia between equity and bonds, between equity at di®erent
points in time, and between portfolios formed by sorting equities on their book-to-market
ratio. According to Fama and French (1992), value stocks earn returns that are on average
six percent higher than growth stocks; this premium is of the same size as the equity risk
premium itself.
The two most common approaches to tackling the shortcomings of the Lucas-Breeden
model are changing the preferences1, or changing the dynamics of the aggregate consumption
process.2 While the canonical external habit model is successful at generating an uncondi-
tional equity premium and time-variation in conditional asset pricing moments, it generates
a negative value premium in the cross-section (Lettau and Wachter (2006)). The reason is
that a negative aggregate consumption growth shock depresses the price of long-lived as-
sets by more because the shock a®ects future marginal utility terms through the surplus
consumption ratio dynamics. In other words, the term structure of consumption strip risk
premia is upward sloping instead of downward sloping. To generate a positive value premium
in the habit model, Santos and Veronesi (2006) model growth and value stocks as having
substantially di®erent cash-°ow properties. The heterogeneity in correlations between div-
idend growth and consumption growth needed to generate a six percent value premium is
larger than in the data. As for the second approach, Bansal, Dittmar and Lundblad (2001)
use the Bansal-Yaron model to price portfolios with di®erent exposure to the small, pre-
dictable component in consumption growth. This exposure is estimated to be di®erent for
1Habit style preferences are most commonly used, see Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), Ferson and
Constantinides (1991), Abel (1999), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and Menzly, Santos and Veronesi (2004)
for early contributions. Another approach is to model non-separable preferences over a second good, such as
housing (Flavin (2001) and Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel (2006)) or durables (Dunn and Singleton (1986),
Eichenbaum and Hansen (1990), and Yogo (2006))
2Bansal and Yaron (2004) introduce a small but very persistent component in aggregate consumption
and dividend growth. Bekaert, Engstrom and Grenadier (2004) combine this speci¯cation with habit style
preferences.
1value and growth stocks. Hansen, Heaton and Li (2005) use a similar approach to price the
cross-section. The di±culty with this approach is that it is hard to estimate the correlation
of dividend growth with the persistent component in consumption growth. The latter is
proxied by long-horizon consumption growth, on which we have few observations.
Instead of staying within the representative agent framework, we introduce heterogeneity
among agents. Our focus is on the impact of time variation in risk sharing on asset prices.
In the model, households di®er only by their income histories. They share income risk
by trading contingent claims, but they cannot borrow more than the value of their house.
When housing collateral is scarce, collateral constraints constrain risk sharing more, and,
as a result, risk premia are higher. Thus, risk premia vary over time and with the housing
collateral ratio. This modest friction is a realistic one for an advanced economy like the US.3
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that the endogenous time variation
in the amount of housing collateral can quantitatively account for the di®erences in expected
returns between value and growth portfolios.
A large literature links the value premium to production-side factors or technological
change (Gomes, Kogan and Zhang (2003b), Gomes, Yaron and Zhang (2003a), Zhang (2005),
Galla (2005), Gourio (2005), and Panageas and Yu (2006)). Our approach is complementary;
its goal is to investigate how much of that value premium can be accounted for by incomplete
risk-sharing and housing collateral constraints in an otherwise standard consumption-based
asset pricing model.
We start by brie°y setting up the model (section 1) and focus on its asset pricing im-
plications. The households trade a complete menu of assets, as in Lucas (1978), but they
face endogenous solvency constraints because they can repudiate their debts. When a house-
hold chooses to repudiate its debts, it loses all its housing wealth but its labor income is
protected from creditors. The household is not excluded from trading.4 We carefully cal-
3Our emphasis on housing, rather than ¯nancial assets, re°ects three features of the US economy: the
participation rate in housing markets is very high (2/3 of households own their home), the value of the
residential real estate makes up over seventy-¯ve percent of total assets for the median household (Survey of
Consumer Finances, 2001), and housing is a prime source of collateral (75 percent of household borrowing
in the data is collateralized by housing wealth, US Flow of Funds, 2003). To keep the model exposition
simple, we abstract from ¯nancial assets or other kinds of capital (such as cars) that households may use to
collateralize loans. However, in the calibration we explore the e®ects of using a broader measure of collateral.
4In Kehoe and Levine (1993), Krueger (2000), Kehoe and Perri (2002), and Krueger and Perri (2005),
2ibrate the model in section 2. The model and calibration are identical to Lustig and Van
Nieuwerburgh (2006b), and are repeated for convenience.
Value stocks earn returns that are on average six percent higher than growth stocks and
they have higher Sharpe ratios. Our model replicates these features of the data (section
3). Figure 1 shows that return spreads on book-to-market sorted portfolios predicted by the
model line up nicely with the same spreads in the data. Our model endogenously generates
a positive value premium when value stocks are short-duration assets. The reason lies in
the term structure of consumption risk premia it generates. In a recent paper, Lettau and
Wachter (2006) point out that, if value stocks are short-duration stocks and growth stocks
long-duration stocks, a positive value premium requires the term structure of consumption
risk premia to be downward sloping. Yet, the habit formation model of Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) generates an upward sloping term structure of consumption risk premia:
Since a bad consumption shock increases discount rates almost permanently, the price of
long-maturity consumption claims would fall by more. In other words, growth stocks would
earn a larger risk premium. In contrast, a bad consumption shock in our model increases
discount rates temporarily. It does not a®ect the collateral ratio, which governs discount
rates in the long run. As a result, the price of consumption strips of longer maturity is
insulated from bad consumption shocks today. This generates lower expected returns on
growth stocks than value stocks.
[Figure 1 about here.]
limited commitment is also the source of incomplete risk-sharing. But the outside option upon default is
exclusion from all future risk sharing arrangements. Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show how to decentralize
these Kehoe and Levine (1993) equilibria with sequential trade. Geanakoplos and Zame (2000) and Kubler
and Schmedders (2003) consider a di®erent environment in which individual assets collateralize individual
promises in a standard incomplete markets economy. We model the outside option as bankruptcy with loss
of all collateral assets; all promises are backed by all collateral assets.
31 Model
1.1 Environment
Uncertainty The economy is populated by a continuum of in¯nitely lived households. The
structure of uncertainty is twofold: s = (y;z) is an event that consists of a household-speci¯c
component y 2 Y and an aggregate component z 2 Z. These events take on values on a
discrete grid S = Y £Z. We use st = (yt;zt) to denote the history of events. St denotes the
set of possible histories up until time t. The state s follows a Markov process with transition







0jy;z) 8z 2 Z;y 2 Y:
Because of the law of large numbers, ¼z(y) denotes both the fraction of households drawing
y when the aggregate event is z and the probability that a given household is in state y when
the aggregate state is z.5
Preferences We use fxg to denote an in¯nite stream fxt(st)g
1
t=0. There are two types
of commodities in this economy: a consumption good c and housing services h. These































The parameter Ã > 0 converts the housing stock into a service °ow, ° governs the degree
of relative risk aversion, and " is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between non-
5The usual caveat applies when applying the law or large numbers.
4durable consumption and housing services.6
Endowments The aggregate endowment of the non-durable consumption good is denoted
fcag. The growth rate of the aggregate endowment depends only on the current aggregate
state: ca
t+1(zt+1) = ¸(zt+1)ca
t(zt). Each household is endowed with a labor income stream
f´g. The labor income share ^ ´(yt;zt) = ´(yt;zt)=ca(zt), only depends on the current state





0;z) = 1; 8z;t ¸ 0:
The aggregate endowment of housing services is denoted fhag and ½(zt) denotes the
relative price of a unit of housing services. The calibration speci¯es a process for the ratio of
non-housing expenditures and housing services expenditures frg, r(zt) =
ca(zt)
½(zt)ha(zt), rather
than for fhag directly.
Trading Each household is assigned a label (`;s0), where ` denotes the time-zero collateral
wealth of this household. The cross-sectional distribution of initial non-labor wealth and
income states (`;s0) is denoted L0.7 We let fc(`;s0)g denote the stream of consumption and
we let fh(`;s0)g denote the stream of housing services of a household of type (`;s0). The
¯nancial markets are complete: households trade a complete set of contingent claims a in
forward markets, where ¡at(`;st;s0) is a promise made by agent (`;s0) to deliver one unit
of the consumption good if event s0 is realized in the next period. These claims are in zero
net supply, and trade at prices qt(st;s0).8 All prices are quoted in units of the non-durable
consumption good. There are frictionless rental markets and markets for home ownership;
ownership and housing consumption are separated. The rental price is ½t(zt); ph
t(zt) denotes
the (asset) price of the housing stock. Because of the law of large numbers, these prices only
6The preferences belong to the class of homothetic power utility functions of Eichenbaum and Hansen
(1990). Special cases are separability (" = °¡1) and Cobb-Douglas preferences (" = 1).
7So, ` denotes the value of the initial claim to housing wealth as well as any ¯nancial wealth that is in zero
net aggregate supply. In the model there is no ¯nancial wealth in positive net supply, but in the calibration
we consider augmenting the collateral stock to include realistic values of other ¯nancial wealth.
8This setup is equivalent to having ¯nancial intermediaries trade in state contingent claims and provide
insurance to the households (Atkeson and Lucas (1993)).
5depend on aggregate histories.
At the start of each period, the household purchases non-housing consumption in the
spot market ct(`;st), housing services in the rental market hr
t(`;st), contingent claims in the
¯nancial market and ownership shares in the housing stock ho












































Collateral Constraints Households can default on their debts. When the household
defaults, it keeps its labor income in all future periods. The household is not excluded from
trading, even in the same period. However, all collateral wealth is taken away. As a result,
the markets impose a solvency constraint that keeps the households from defaulting: all of
a household's state-contingent promises must be backed by the cum-dividend value of its
housing owned at the end of period t, ho
t+1. In each node st, households face a separate














; for all s
t;s
0: (4)
As in Alvarez and Jermann (2000), these constraints are not too tight: they allow for the
maximal degree of risk sharing, given that agents cannot be excluded from trading, while
preventing default.
1.2 Equilibrium Asset Prices
Competitive Equilibrium. Given a distribution over initial non-labor wealth and initial





such that (i) for given prices and initial wealth, the allocation solves
each household's maximization problem (1) s.t. (2), (3) and (4), and (ii) the markets for the
consumption good, the housing services, the contingent claims and housing ownership shares
clear.
As in other endogenously incomplete markets models, assets are priced by the uncon-
strained agents at every date and state (Alvarez and Jermann (2000)). These unconstrained
households have the highest intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS), equal to


































The second equality follows from the form of the utility function, the de¯nition of the expen-
diture ratio r = ca
½ha, and market clearing in the housing market.9 No arbitrage implies that
the return on any security j, R
j
t+1, satis¯es the standard Euler equation Et[mt+1R
j
t+1] = 1.
We detail the equilibrium consumption dynamics in section 2 of Lustig and Van Nieuwer-




















The ¯rst two factors arise in the representative agent (or perfect risk-sharing) version of our
model, whereas the third term is new and re°ects the risk of binding collateral constraints.
The quantity gt+1 measures the increase in the extent to which the housing collateral con-
straints bind in the aggregate. The dynamics of g are responsible for generating the value
premium in this model.







"; 8i. Since there is one economy-




Consequently, all households equate their non-housing to housing consumption ratios r(zt).
71.3 Two Driving Forces
To build intuition for the asset pricing results, we ¯rst explain the two main driving forces
of the model: shocks to the wealth distribution, operating at business cycle frequencies, and
variation in the housing collateral ratio, operating at low frequencies. Both of these forces
a®ect the SDF mt+1 in (6) through its third term g
°
t+1, which we label the aggregate weight
shock.
Shocks to the Wealth Distribution Because risk sharing is imperfect, the higher cross-
sectional income dispersion in a low aggregate consumption growth state results in more
wealth and consumption dispersion. First, the household cuto® levels (at which the collateral
constraints hold with equality) are higher in low aggregate consumption growth states, and
this makes the consumption increase for households that switch to a state with a binding
constraint larger. Second, low aggregate consumption growth states are short-lived in our
model and agents are more constrained in these states as a result, because of their desire to
smooth out its e®ect on their consumption. As the combined result of these two forces, the
size of the aggregate weight shock increases more in low aggregate consumption growth states
(gt+1(zt;re) > gt+1(zt;ex)). However, after a low consumption growth shock accompanied
by a large aggregate weight shock gt+1, the left tail of the wealth distribution is cleansed,
and subsequent aggregate weight shocks are much smaller. This cleansing mechanism lowers
the conditional market price of risk ¾t[mt+1=Et[mt+1] and increases the interest rate after
a bad shock. These wealth distribution dynamics operate at business cycle frequencies and
are also present in Lustig (2003). They are a ¯rst source of heteroscedasticity in the SDF,
and will allow the model to match year-to-year variation in stock returns.
Housing Collateral Mechanism There is another source of heteroscedasticity: low fre-
quency changes in the housing collateral ratio. This paper's novel feature are movements in
the housing collateral ratio that come from exogenous movement in the non-housing expen-
diture ratio r together with endogenous movements in the SDF. It is these low frequency
movements in the housing collateral ratio that will allow the model the match asset prices
at low frequencies.
8Figure 2 illustrates the collateral mechanism for a typical two hundred period simulation
of the benchmark model. The calibration is in section 2 below. Panel 1 plots the housing
collateral ratio my (bold, right axis) together with the expenditure ratio r (single line, left
axis). It shows that the housing collateral ratio increases when households spend a larger
share of income on housing. The persistence of my comes from this relationship. Panel 2
plots the cross-sectional consumption growth dispersion (single line, left axis) against the
housing collateral ratio my (bold line, right axis). It summarizes the risk sharing dynamics in
the model. When collateral is scarce, more households run into binding collateral constraints.
To prevent default, the consumption share of the constrained households increases. At the
same time, the unconstrained households' consumption share decreases precipitously. As a
result, the cross-sectional standard deviation of consumption growth increases, evidence of
less risk-sharing. For example, in a period of collateral abundance (period 126), ¾t[¢logct+1]
is 8.1%, whereas in a period of collateral scarcity (period 174), it is only 0.9%.10 The
aggregate weight shock gt+1, plotted in panel 3, measures the economy-wide extent to which
the solvency constraints bind. It also governs the new component to the SDF g
°
t+1. The
panel illustrates that when collateral is scarce, constraints bind more frequently and more
severely and this is re°ected in a large aggregate weight shock. For example, in period 126
the liquidity shock is 1.07, whereas in period 174 it is only 1.01. The SDF is higher and more
volatile in such periods of collateral scarcity, and quite di®erent from the representative agent
SDF. The last three panels illustrate how this impacts asset prices: the equity premium is
lower and the conditional equity volatility and the conditional Sharpe ratio are higher when
collateral is scarce. Households demand a larger compensation for risk when it is hard to
insure income shocks. As we show below, there is an intimate link between this time-series
variation in the conditional market equity premium and the cross-sectional variation in risk
premia.
[Figure 2 about here.]
10As an aside, even though the consumption shares change in important ways when collateral constraints
bind, the unconditional volatility of consumption growth for an individual household is moderate. In our
benchmark model it is less than 10% of the unconditional volatility of individual income growth. There is
still a considerable amount of risk-sharing.
92 Calibration
There are two driving forces in the model: the income process and the non-housing expen-
diture ratio.
Income Process The ¯rst driving force in the model is the Markov process for the non-
durable endowment process. It has an aggregate and an idiosyncratic component. The
aggregate endowment growth process is taken from Mehra and Prescott (1985) and replicates
the moments of aggregate consumption growth in the 1871-1979 data. Aggregate endowment
growth, ¸, follows an autoregressive process:
¸t(zt) = ½¸¸t¡1(zt¡1) + "t;
with ½¸ = ¡:14;E(¸) = :0183 and ¾(¸) = :0357. We discretize the AR(1) process with
two aggregate growth states z = (ex;re) = [1:04;:96] (for expansion and recession) and an
aggregate state transition matrix [:83;:17;:69;:31]. The implied ratio of the probability of
a high aggregate endowment growth state to the probability of a low aggregate endowment
growth state is 2.65. The unconditional probability of a low endowment growth state is
27.4%. This matches the observed frequency of recessions.
The idiosyncratic labor income volatility in the US increases in recessions (Storeslet-
ten, Telmer and Yaron (2004)). Our calibrated labor income process shares this feature.
Following Alvarez and Jermann (2001), log labor income shares follow an AR(1) process
with autocorrelation of .92, and a conditional variance of .181 in low and .0467 in high
aggregate endowment growth states. Discretization into a four-state Markov chain re-
sults in individual income states (´1(hi;ex);´1(lo;ex)) = [:6578;:3422] in the high and
(´1(hi;re);´1(lo;re)) = [:7952;:2048] in the low aggregate endowment growth state.11 We
refer to the counter-cyclical labor income share dispersion as the Mankiw (1986) e®ect.
11The one di®erence with the Storesletten et al. (2004) calibration is that recessions are shorter in our
calibration. In their paper the economy is in the low aggregate endowment growth state half of the time.
That implies that the unconditional variance of our labor income process is lower.
10Expenditure Ratio The second driving force in the model is the process for the ratio of
non-housing to housing expenditures frg. Calibrating the expenditure ratio is equivalent to
calibrating the evolution of the aggregate housing stock fhg and imposing the intra-temporal
optimality condition. Following Piazzesi et al. (2006), we specify an autoregressive process
which also depends on aggregate endowment growth ¸:
logrt+1 = ¹ r + ½r logrt + br¸t+1 + ¾rºt+1; (7)
where ºt+1 is an i.i.d. standard normal process with mean zero, orthogonal to ¸t+1. In our
benchmark calibration we set ½r = :96, br = :93 and ¾r = :03. The parameter values come
from estimating equation (7) on US data.12 We discretize the process for log(r) as a ¯ve-
state Markov process. A second calibration switches o® the e®ect of consumption growth
by setting br = 0. Both calibrations ¯x ¾r = :03. We choose the constant ¹ r to match the
average housing expenditure share of 19% in the data (NIPA, 1929 to 2004).
Average Housing Collateral Ratio A key quantitative question is whether collateral is
su±ciently scarce for our borrowing constraints to have a large e®ect. Because this question
is an important one, we consider two measures to calibrate the average ratio of collateral
wealth to total wealth. The ¯rst measure focuses on housing collateral, the second measure
includes non-housing sources of collateral.
We measure factor payments to housing wealth as total US rental income and factor
payments to human wealth as labor income (compensation of employees). NIPA data show
that rental income was 3.4% of rental income plus labor income in 1946-2002 and 4.3% in
1929-2002. Because the factor payments ratio maps directly into the housing collateral ratio,
the data suggest a housing collateral ratio less than 5%.13
To be on the safe side, our second estimate is a broad collateral measure. It includes
¯nancial wealth, the market value of the non-farm non-¯nancial corporate sector in the US.
We add interest payments and dividend payments to the income stream from collateralizable
12Table 1 in a separate appendix shows regression estimates for ½r and br.
13If r is constant, the housing collateral ratio or the ratio of housing wealth to total wealth is
1=r
1+1=r =
1=(1+ r). This is a very good approximation for the average collateral ratio in the model with stochastic r.
11wealth and we add proprietary income to the income stream from non-collateralizable wealth.
The factor payment ratio increases to 8.6% in the post-war sample and 9.4% in the full sample
(row 2), suggesting a housing collateral ratio less than 10%.
An alternative approach is to compare the collateralizable wealth to income ratio in
model and data. Assuming that the expected return on total collateralizable assets is 9%
and the expected dividend growth rate is 3%, then a collateral ratio of 5% implies a collateral
wealth-to-income ratio of 85% according to Gordon's growth formula: :85 = :05=(:09¡:03).
Likewise, the implied wealth-to-income ratio is 150% when the collateral ratio is 10%. In
US data, the 1929-2004 average ratio of mortgages to income is 55%. If we include ¯nancial
wealth, that ratio increases to 155%. This approach also points towards a housing collateral
ratio of 5% and a broad collateral ratio of 10%.14
Finally, Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989) estimate human wealth to be 93% of total wealth,
implying a collateral ratio of 7%.
We take the model with a 5% collateral ratio as our benchmark and consider the econ-
omy with a 10% collateral ratio as an alternative. To simultaneously match the average
expenditure share of housing services (¹ r) of 19% and the average ratio of housing wealth to
total wealth (my) of 5% or 10%, we scale up the aggregate non-housing endowment.
Preference Parameters In the benchmark calibration, we use additive utility with dis-
count rate ± = :95, coe±cient of relative risk aversion ° = 8, and intratemporal elasticity
of substitution between non-housing and housing consumption " = :05. We ¯x the relative
weight on housing in the utility function Ã = 1 throughout.15 Because our goal is to explain
conditional moments of the market return, we choose the parameter ° to match the uncondi-
tional market risk premium. We also compute the model for ° 2 f2;5;10g and " 2 f:15;:75g.
14The Gordon growth model is an approximation. Appendix C of Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006b)
provides a detailed analysis of this asset value approach to calibrating the collateral share. It reports that
the benchmark calibration (my = 0:05) produces a collateral wealth-to-income ratio of 96%. If the average
my were to be calibrated higher, there would have to be a lot more tradeable wealth in the US economy.
15The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion ¡cucc
uc = ( rt
1+rt)° + ( 1
1+rt)"¡1 is a linear combination
of ° and " with weights depending on the non-durable expenditure ratio rt. In the simulations r = 4:26 on
average, so that the weight on ° is .81 on average. Because rt is not very volatile, neither is the degree of
risk aversion.












In NIPA data (1930-2004), the left hand side of (8) is .046 and the right-hand side is .041.
The implied " is .098. By choosing a low ", we impose that rental prices are consistent with
the expenditure ratio. A choice for " closer to one helps to generate a higher average equity
premium and lower risk-free rate, but implies excessive rental price volatility.
Stock Market Return We de¯ne the stock market return as the return on a leveraged
claim to the aggregate consumption process fca
tg and denote it by Rl. In the data, dividends
are more volatile than aggregate consumption. We choose leverage parameter · = 3, where
¾(¢logdt+1) = ·¾(¢logca
t+1).16 We also price a non-levered claim on the aggregate con-
sumption stream, denoted Rc. The excess returns, in excess of a risk-free rate, are denoted
Rl;e and Rc;e. Table 1 summarizes the benchmark parametrization and the other values we
consider in the sensitivity analysis.
[Table 1 about here.]
Computation Our computational strategy is to keep track of cross-sectional distribu-
tions over wealth and endowments that change over time. Appendix B of Lustig and Van
Nieuwerburgh (2006b) provides the algorithm.
Data We use two distinct measures of the housing collateral stock: the value of outstanding
home mortgages (MO) and the market value of residential real estate wealth (RW). These
time series are from the Historical Statistics for the US (Bureau of the Census) for the period
1889-1945 and from the Flow of Funds (Federal Board of Governors) for 1945-2001. We use
both the value of mortgages and the total value of residential wealth to allow for changes
in the extent to which housing can be used as a collateral asset. National income is labor
16For the period 1930-2004, the volatility of annual nominal dividend growth is 14.8%, whereas the volatil-
ity of annual nominal consumption growth (non-durables and services excluding housing services) is 5.6%, a
ratio of 2.6.
13income plus net transfer income from the Historical Statistics of the US for 1926-1930 and
from the National Income and Product Accounts for 1930-2001. The housing collateral ratio
myt is estimated as the residual from a cointegration relationship between MO or RW and Y ,
and is therefore a stationary variable. Details are provided in Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2005) and the data are downloadable from the authors' web sites. Collateral is scarcer when
myt is lower. For convenience, we introduce a measure of collateral scarcity that is always
between 0 and 1: f myt =
max(myt)¡myt
max(myt)¡min(myt), where max(myt) and min(myt) are the sample
maximum and minimum of fmytg.
3 Cross-sectional Variation in Risk Premia
Firms with a high ratio of book value to market value of equity (value ¯rms) historically
have higher returns than those with a low book-to-market ratio (growth ¯rms). Panel 1
of Table 2 reports sample means, volatilities, and Sharpe ratios for the excess returns on
ten book-to-market deciles. The annual excess return on a zero-cost investment strategy
that goes long in the highest book-to-market decile and short in the lowest decile is 6.8%
for 1930-2003 and 6.5% for 1945-2003. The Sharpe ratios for the highest and lowest decile
portfolios are .56 and .37 for 1945-2003 and .42 and .32 for 1930-2003.17
The paper's main result is that the collateral model can endogenously generate this value
premium. We perform two exercises to substantiate this claim. In the ¯rst exercise we
generate excess returns on value decile portfolios from an empirically plausible factor model.
In a second exercise, we impose a speci¯c timing on the cash °ows of value and growth
portfolios and compute returns on these portfolios.
[Table 2 about here.]
17Similar value premia are found for monthly and quarterly returns and for quintile instead of decile
portfolios. Using quarterly data for 1951-2002, unconditional Sharpe ratios for value stocks (.64) are twice
as large as for growth stocks (.32) (Lettau and Wachter (2006)).
143.1 Plugging the Empirical Betas into Model
Value stocks command higher expected returns because their returns co-vary more strongly
with aggregate consumption growth when collateral is scarce (Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2005)). In a ¯rst step, we use data on the decile value portfolio returns to describe the
return-generating process for each of the book-to-market decile portfolios. We then price
these returns inside the model and show that returns on high book-to-market portfolios
carry a higher risk premium than returns on low book-to-market portfolios. The return
spread in the model matches the spread in the data.
Decile Return Processes in Data To estimate the relationship between excess returns
on book-to-market decile portfolios and the model's state variables (c;r; f my), we use data on
aggregate consumption growth, expenditure share growth, and the housing collateral ratio




















r;my f myt+1¢logrt+1 + º
j
t+1; (9)
by OLS. These are the ¯ve risk factors in the collateral model. The estimates are reported
in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here.]
When collateral is abundant (f myt = 0), the sensitivity of excess returns to aggregate
consumption growth is ¯c (Figure 3, left column). The returns on value stocks (decile
10) are high in recessions while growth stocks (decile 1) are much less sensitive to aggregate
consumption growth; j¯cj increases monotonically from decile 1 to decile 10. When collateral
is scarce (f myt = 1), the consumption beta is ¯c+¯c;my (right column). Value stocks are more
sensitive to consumption growth shocks when collateral is scarce: ¯c;my > 0 is much higher
for the tenth decile than for the ¯rst decile portfolio. This sensitivity pattern results in higher
expected returns for value stocks than for growth stocks. This e®ect is reinforced because
value stocks are also more sensitive to aggregate expenditure ratio shocks; ¯r increases
monotonically for both collateral measures (not shown).
15[Figure 3 about here.]
Decile Return Processes in Model In a second step, we generate ten excess return










and simulated model state variables. For each excess return, the intercept ¯
j
0 is chosen to
make the Euler equation hold: Et[mt+1R
j;e
t+1] = 0. This ensures that the model SDF prices
the book-to-market decile returns correctly on average. We then simulate the model for
10,000 periods and compute unconditional means and standard deviations of each decile
portfolio return.
The second panel of table 2 reports the excess returns on the ten value portfolios pre-
dicted by the collateral model, ordered from growth (B1) to value (B10) for the benchmark
parametrization. We use two sets of empirical factor loadings corresponding to di®erent
housing collateral measures. For the mortgage-based collateral measure, the value spread is
6.8%, matching the data. For the residential wealth measure, the value spread is even larger:
8.4%. Furthermore, the model predicts that the Sharpe ratio of the tenth decile (value) is
double that of the ¯rst decile (growth), similar to the post-war data. Figure 1 (in the in-
troduction) plots the return di®erence between deciles 2-9 and the lowest book-to-market
portfolio for the model and for the data. The model does quite well in reproducing these
spreads; if anything, the model's spreads are too large.
Representative Agent Model In the representative agent economy, there are no collat-
eral constraints and perfect risk sharing obtains. This amounts to setting f my = 0 in equation
(9). The estimated consumption growth and expenditure growth betas exhibit little varia-
tion across decile portfolios. The simulated returns that these betas imply, do not generate
a value premium, and lower Sharpe ratios on value stocks than on growth stocks, all at odds
with the data.18
18Detailed results available upon request.
163.2 Pricing Stocks with Di®erent Duration
Growth stocks have been described as assets with longer maturities than value stocks (De-
chow, Sloan and Soliman (2002) and Lettau and Wachter (2006)). The second approach
models growth stocks (value stocks) as a basket of consumption strips that is weighted to-
wards longer (shorter) maturities. A period-k consumption strip is a claim to aggregate
consumption ct+k, k years from the current period t.
The multiplicative (one year) equity premium E0Re
0;1[fckg], the expected return on a non-
levered claim to the entire stream of aggregate consumption fckg1
k=1 divided by the risk-free













The second term in the sum is the (gross) expected return on a period k consumption
strip E0R0;1 [ck] divided by the (gross) risk-free rate R0;1 [1]. The weight !k represents the
value of the period k consumption strip relative to the total value of all consumption strips.
Mk is the pricing kernel in period k. It is linked to the stochastic discount factor m by
Mk = m1 £ ¢¢¢ £ mk. (See appendix A for the derivation of equation 10).
We think of value stocks as a claim to a di®erently weighted stream of aggregate consump-
tion ffv(k)ckg1
k=1, where the function f(¢) puts more weight on the consumption realizations
in the near future. For example, fv(k) = Ceak, where a is a negative number and C is a
normalization constant, C =
P1
k=1 ck P1
k=1 eakck. Likewise, growth stocks are a claim to a weighted
stream of aggregate consumption ffg(k)ckg1
k=1, where f(¢) puts more weight on the con-
sumption realizations in the far future. For example, fg(k) = Ceak, where a is a positive
number. The multiplicative equity premium e º0 on such a basket of consumption strips with
weights f(k) is:










The following proposition shows that the properties of the pricing kernel determine the
sign of the value spread. Appendix A proves that, if the pricing kernel has no permanent
17component, then the highest risk premium is the one on the farthest out consumption strip
(k ! 1). The model generates a growth premium.
Proposition 1. If ° > 1, f(k) = Ceak with a > 0 and if limk!1
E1Mkck
E0Mkck = 1, then lima!1 1+
e º0 = limk!1 Re
0;1[ck] ¸ 1 + º0, for any sequence of weights f!kg in the de¯nition of the
multiplicative risk premium º0.
The proof draws on insights from Alvarez and Jermann (2005). The pricing kernel in
our model contains a permanent component stemming from the risk of binding solvency
constraints, even in the absence of the consumption growth shocks.19 Such a permanent
component is a necessary condition for generating a value premium.
Representative Agent Economy In the representative agent economy, the equity premia
on consumption strips do not change with the horizon. This is easy to show for additive
preferences that are separable in both commodities and aggregate endowment growth that
is i.i.d with mean ¹ ¸.20 The pricing kernel is simply a function of the aggregate consumption






1 . Because the aggregate
endowment grows every period at the rate ¸, M1c1 = ¸
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The expression does not depend on the horizon k, meaning that strip risk premia are constant
across horizons. Since the term structure of consumption risk premia is °at, the value
premium is zero.
Term Structure of Strip Premia and Time-Varying Value Premia Our model
behaves like a representative agent economy when housing collateral is abundant. These
are times when the term structure of risk premia is nearly °at. However, collateral scarcity
19Section ?? explains that the aggregate weight shock, which measures the extent of binding solvency
constraints and enters as a multiplicative term in the SDF, is a non-decreasing stochastic process.
20A similar result obtains if preferences are non-separable and aggregate expenditure share growth is i.i.d.,
even when aggregate expenditure share growth is correlated with aggregate consumption growth.
18generates a downward sloping term structure of risk premia. Since the model oscillates
between abundant collateral (°at term structure) and scarce collateral (downward sloping
term structure), it generates a downward slope on average. This generates a value premium,
because value stocks load more heavily on short duration consumption strips. Put di®erently,
because short term assets are more risky than long term assets, the expected return and
Sharpe ratio are higher for value stocks than growth stocks.
The downward sloping term structure relies crucially on having two model driving forces
that operate at di®erent horizons: changes in aggregate consumption growth, which cause
shocks to the wealth distribution, at business cycle frequencies and changes to the collat-
eral ratio at low frequencies. Risk premia on long-maturity assets respond mostly to low-
frequency collateral changes, whereas short-maturity assets respond to both shocks. Suppose
that collateral is scarce and there is a negative aggregate consumption growth shock (a re-
cession). This shock resolves risk, because it lowers the likelihood of being constrained in
the immediate future (the left tail of the wealth distribution is `cleansed'). The risk pre-
mium decreases. But the risk-free rate increases by more so that the discount rate increases.
Higher discount rates imply lower prices. But because the aggregate consumption growth
shock is temporary, it only lowers the price of short-maturity assets and not the price of
long-maturity assets.
Prices and expected returns are inversely related, so that the term structure of expected
returns is downward sloping. Put di®erently, expected returns on value stocks increase
because short-duration assets have higher consumption growth risk when collateral is scarce.
For long-duration assets such as growth stocks, only long-term discount rates matter. These
are governed by the housing collateral ratio and not by aggregate consumption growth.
If there is only one driving force, as in the habit formation model, a fall in aggregate
consumption increases marginal utility growth not just today, but persistently into the future.
Therefore, it generates a bigger price decline of long-duration consumption strips than of
short-duration strips. The term structure of risk premia is upward sloping. The habit model
predicts a growth premium (Lettau and Wachter (2006)).
Panels 1 and 2 of Figure 4 plot the expected return and Sharpe ratio on consumption
strips of horizons of 1 to 45 years for the benchmark model. Long-maturity strips have risk
19premia and Sharpe ratios that are lower than those for short-maturity strips. This pattern
can be traced back to their di®erential consumption risk.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Finally, panel 3 of Table 2 reports equity premia on claims to fCeakckg. These are baskets
of consumption strips of di®erent maturities, where the constant a governs the duration of
the basket. The leverage parameter · is 2. We vary a from .5 to -.5. The corresponding
baskets have a duration between 43 years and 2 years (row 1). We think of the baskets
with long-duration as the growth portfolios and the baskets with short-duration as the value
portfolios (Dechow et al. (2002)). The benchmark model generates a maximum value spread
of 5.2% between the 8-year and the 43-year portfolios, close to the value spread in the data.
In addition, the Sharpe ratios on the value portfolios are much higher than the Sharpe ratios
on the growth portfolios. The bottom row of Figure 4 con¯rms that long-duration assets
(growth stocks) have lower risk premia and lower Sharpe ratios.
4 Conclusion
This paper shows how endogenous, state-contingent borrowing constraints interact with
shocks in the housing market to deliver plausible asset pricing predictions. Equilibrium
changes in the value of the housing stock change the degree to which risk sharing takes place,
and modify households' ability to commit to allocations and prices. The model matches the
cross-sectional variation in risk premia on book-to-market sorted stocks.
In a recent paper, Daniel and Titman (2005) question the success of a string of recent
(conditional) CCAPM papers in explaining the cross-section of size and value returns. Their
point is that one only needs two factors to explain returns along the two risk dimensions size
and value. What is needed then to tell the models apart is more over-identifying restrictions
(more asset pricing moments), and other (non-asset pricing) evidence. We have taken the
second route in other work. In this paper, we chose the ¯rst route. We have tried to match
not only the cross-section of risk premia, but also the time-variation in returns on equity
and debt, not only at business-cycle frequencies, but also at lower frequencies. Since most
20models in this class have two factors, they argue, it is impossible to judge their relative
success. Indeed, the stochastic discount factors in these models all feature consumption
growth and a second factor with similar time-series properties (see discussion in Guvenen
(2003)).
What is needed then to tell the models apart is (1) more over-identifying restrictions
(more asset pricing moments), and (2) other (non-asset pricing) evidence. First, we have tried
to match not only at the cross-section of risk premia, but also conditional and unconditional
equity premia. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006b) shows that this model also accounts
for the time-variation in conditional asset pricing moments and that it can generate a large
unconditional equity premium and a low risk-free rate. There, we have studied not only
business-cycle frequency changes in the equity premium and the risk-free rate, but also low-
frequency changes. We have insisted on a serious calibration the model, and have fed the
observed shocks into the model. Second, in Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006a), we use
quantity rather than price data to test the model. Focussing on US metropolitan areas, we
¯nd that the degree of risk-sharing between them decreases when the housing collateral ratio
is low. This ¯nding o®ers direct support for the collateral mechanism.
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25Figure 1: Return Spreads in Book-to-Market Portfolios
This graph plots returns of the 9 highest book-to-market decile portfolios in excess of the return on the ¯rst decile portfolio. It
plots the model-implied return spreads on the horizontal axis against the return spreads observed in the data (vertical axis).
The stock returns on the book-to-market decile portfolios are from Kenneth French's web site. the data are annual for the period
1945-2003. The ¯rst panel shows model-generated spreads computed using a mortgage-based collateral measure. The second
panel uses a residential wealth-based collateral measure. The model simulation uses the benchmark calibration, discussed in
section 2.2, and the computation is detailed in section 4.2.
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26Figure 2: Risk Sharing, Conditional Asset Pricing Moments and Collateral Ratio
The graphs display a two hundred period model simulation under the benchmark parametrization (see Table 1). The shocks are
the same in each panel. The ¯rst panel plots the non-housing expenditure ratio r. The second panel plots the cross-sectional
standard deviation of consumption growth across households (¾t[¢logct+1]). The third panel is the aggregate weight shock
gt+1. The fourth panel plots the equity premium predicted by the model, i.e. the expected excess return on a non-levered claim

























. Each of these series are measured against the left axis and
plotted in a single blue line. The housing collateral ratio my is measured against the right axis and plotted in a bold red line.
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27Figure 3: Beta Estimates for Book-to-Market Decile Returns in Data.
This ¯gure plots consumption betas when collateral is abundant (left panels) and when collateral is scarce (right panels) for
ten book-to-market decile portfolios. The portfolios are organized from the lowest book-to-market decile (growth) on the left to
the highest book-to-market decile (value) on the right of each horizontal axis. The betas are estimated from OLS regression of
excess returns of the 10 book-to-market deciles on a constant, the collateral scarcity measure f myt, the aggregate consumption
growth rate ¢logca
t+1, the interaction term f myt¢logca
t+1, the aggregate expenditure ratio growth rate ¢logrt+1, and the
interaction term f myt¢logrt+1. These are the ¯ve risk factors in the collateral model. In the ¯rst panel the housing collateral
ratio is based on the value of outstanding mortgages; in the second panel the housing collateral ratio is based on the value of
residential real estate wealth. The data are annual for the period 1930-2003.


















































































































28Figure 4: Term Structure of Consumption Strips.
The ¯rst panel plots the conditional expected excess return on a levered claim to aggregate consumption k periods from now,
where k = 2;3;:::;45. The second panel shows the corresponding Sharpe ratios. Panel 3 plots the risk premium for the
duration-based portfolios against duration. Panel 4 plots the Sharpe ratio for the duration-based portfolios against duration.
The leverage parameter · is 2.
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29Table 1: Parameter Calibration












30Table 2: Value Premium in Data and in the Collateral Model
Panel 1 reports moments of book-to-market decile portfolio returns in excess of a risk-free rate: the sample mean, the sample
volatility and the Sharpe ratio. The risk-free rate is the annual return on a 3-month T-Bill. The value-weighted stock returns
on the book-to-market deciles are annual for 1930-2003 and 1945-2003, and the source is Kenneth French's web site. Panel 2
reports the decile returns generated by the model as described in section 5.1. The panel reports expected returns, standard
deviation and Sharpe ratio on an arti¯cial asset generated with a set of betas listed in Table 2 of the separate appendix, but with
intercept ¯
j
0 chosen so that the Euler equation is satis¯ed for this asset in the model. The parametrization is the benchmark
one. The ¯rst block corresponds to the betas obtained using the mortgage-based measure; the second block uses the residential
wealth-based measure. Panel 3 reports the results of the duration-based asset pricing exercise of section 5.2. It reports equity
premia (second row), their volatilities (third row), and Sharpe ratios (fourth row) for 10 portfolios of di®erent duration (¯rst
row). The leverage parameter · is 2.
Panel 1: US Data
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Sample 1930-2003
E(Re) 0:071 0:084 0:080 0:081 0:100 0:099 0:108 0:127 0:131 0:139
¾(Re) 0:222 0:194 0:196 0:229 0:228 0:238 0:250 0:274 0:291 0:332
E(Re)=¾(Re) 0:321 0:431 0:411 0:355 0:437 0:417 0:433 0:464 0:449 0:419
Sample 1945-2003
E(Re) 0:078 0:087 0:086 0:084 0:106 0:107 0:110 0:130 0:126 0:143
¾(Re) 0:209 0:175 0:175 0:178 0:182 0:178 0:194 0:214 0:212 0:257
E(Re)=¾(Re) 0:372 0:497 0:492 0:473 0:580 0:599 0:566 0:604 0:592 0:558
Panel 2: Model with Empirical Betas
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Mortgage-Based Collateral Measure
E(Re) ¡0:002 0:007 0:018 0:018 0:021 0:034 0:060 0:042 0:052 0:066
¾(Re) 0:104 0:065 0:081 0:093 0:107 0:110 0:145 0:130 0:123 0:153
E(Re)=¾(Re) ¡0:020 0:115 0:226 0:190 0:200 0:309 0:418 0:322 0:422 0:433
Residential Wealth-Based Collateral Measure
E(Re) 0:001 0:015 0:022 0:029 0:028 0:051 0:080 0:055 0:072 0:085
¾(Re) 0:116 0:062 0:076 0:088 0:106 0:131 0:178 0:149 0:159 0:191
E(Re)=¾(Re) 0:011 0:241 0:286 0:323 0:266 0:387 0:453 0:370 0:451 0:448
Panel 3: Model with Duration-Based Pricing
Duration 43:387 42:529 39:476 32:166 20:274 13:145 8:870 4:759 3:040 2:328
E[Re] 0:025 0:027 0:034 0:049 0:068 0:075 0:077 0:073 0:067 0:061
¾[Re] 0:191 0:193 0:196 0:202 0:202 0:198 0:192 0:175 0:157 0:142
E[Re]=¾[Re] 0:130 0:138 0:171 0:242 0:336 0:381 0:402 0:416 0:424 0:431
31Table 3: Beta Estimates for Book-to-Market Decile Returns in Data - 5 Factors.
OLS regression of excess returns of the 10 book-to-market deciles on a constant, a scaled version of the collateral measure f myt,
the aggregate consumption growth rate ¢(log(ct+1)), the interaction term f myt¢(log(ct+1)), the aggregate expenditure share
growth rate ¢log(®t+1), and the interaction term f myt¢(log(ct+1)). These are the ¯ve risk factors in the collateral model.
The ¯rst line of each panel is for the lowest book-to-market decile (growth), the last line for the highest book-to-market decile
(value). The number is brackets are OLS t-statistics. In the ¯rst panel the housing collateral ratio is based on the value of
outstanding mortgages and in the second panel, the housing collateral ratio is based on the value of residential real estate
wealth. The data are annual for the period 1930-2003.
¯0 ¯my ¯c ¯c;my ¯® ¯®;my
Panel 1: Mortgage-Based Collateral
1 0:61 12:94 ¡0:50 3:40 15:63 ¡34:80
[5:44] [12:38] [1:70] [3:89] [6:16] [15:09]
2 3:59 10:09 ¡0:86 3:20 10:85 ¡22:54
[4:90] [11:16] [1:53 [3:51] [5:55] [13:60]
3 4:74 6:76 ¡1:83 5:16 13:62 ¡26:97
[4:89] [11:13] [1:52] [3:50] [5:54] [13:56]
4 3:64 10:73 ¡2:69 6:44 24:46 ¡40:95
[5:35] [12:18] [1:67] [3:83] [6:06] [14:85]
5 3:00 16:99 ¡3:16 7:51 22:36 ¡40:71
[5:41] [12:31] [1:69] [3:87] [6:12] [15:00]
6 0:32 18:41 ¡0:90 5:49 21:52 ¡37:33
[5:45] [12:41] [1:70] [3:90] [6:18] [15:12]
7 6:22 9:06 ¡3:55 9:47 20:90 ¡33:64
[6:03] [13:72] [1:88] [4:31] [6:82] [16:71]
8 3:90 19:38 ¡3:08 8:67 24:21 ¡42:34
[6:55] [14:92] [2:04] [4:69] [7:42] [18:18]
9 5:94 18:50 ¡4:41 9:45 23:25 ¡33:85
[7:07] [16:10] [2:21] [5:06] [8:01] [19:62]
10 4:78 21:63 ¡4:36 10:45 25:72 ¡37:27
[8:04] [18:29] [2:51] [5:75] [9:10] [22:29]
Panel 2: Residential Wealth-Based Collateral
1 1:24 11:30 ¡0:78 4:34 15:88 ¡36:85
[5:64] [12:75] [1:84] [4:17] [6:23] [15:75]
2 6:05 3:78 ¡0:89 3:42 9:61 ¡19:25
[5:12] [11:57] [1:67] [3:79] [5:65] [14:30]
3 6:77 1:92 ¡1:76 4:95 12:23 ¡23:24
[5:11] [11:55] [1:67] [3:78] [5:64] [14:27]
4 7:22 1:93 ¡2:65 6:43 22:09 ¡34:30
[5:65] [12:76] [1:84] [4:18] [6:24] [15:77]
5 5:70 10:28 ¡3:23 7:71 20:58 ¡36:54
[5:69] [12:86] [1:86] [4:21] [6:28] [15:89]
6 2:66 12:08 ¡1:28 6:62 19:70 ¡32:80
[5:72] [12:93] [1:87] [4:23] [6:32] [15:98]
7 9:74 0:18 ¡3:99 10:43 18:55 ¡26:68
[6:27] [14:18] [2:05] [4:64] [6:93] [17:52]
8 5:72 14:60 ¡3:54 9:79 22:61 ¡38:87
[6:82] [15:41] [2:23] [5:05] [7:53] [19:04]
9 8:86 10:78 ¡4:89 10:54 20:70 ¡26:95
[7:35] [16:62] [2:40] [5:44] [8:12] [20:53]
10 7:85 13:46 ¡4:94 11:81 23:54 ¡31:84
[8:34] [18:85] [2:72] [6:17] [9:21] [23:30]
32A Technical Appendix
This section contains the proofs of the propositions in the main text. For more details on the model
(de¯nition of the cumulative multipliers, derivation and optimality of the risk sharing rule and the
optimality of the law of motion for the cumulative multipliers), we refer the reader to section 2 of
the separate appendix to this paper, available on our web sites.
Proof of Proposition 1 Following the de¯nition of Alvarez and Jermann (2005), the pricing




























Furthermore, for any return Et[
Mt+1
Mt Rt+1] = 1, we know that Et[log(
Mt+1
Mt Rt+1)] · logEt[
Mt+1
Mt Rt+1] =
0 by Jensen's inequality. This implies that Et log( Mt







¸ Et log(Rt+1) for any asset return Rt+1









Let f(k) = Ceak with a > 0 for growth stocks. In the absence of a permanent component in
the pricing kernel:
lim
a!11 + e º0 = lim
k!1
Rc
t+1;k ¸ 1 + º0 for any other sequence of weights f!kg
This implies that the highest equity premium is the one on the farthest out consumption strip. In
the absence of a permanent component in the pricing kernel, there is a growth premium. ¤
33Derivation of Value Premium The multiplicative risk premium on an (un-levered) con-
sumption strip is derived as follows:
1 + º0 = 1 + E0[Re
0;1[fckg]] = E0M1E0
µP1
k=1 E1Mkck P1
k=1 E0Mkck
¶
=
1 X
k=1
E0Mkck P1
k=1 E0Mkck
E1Mkck
E0Mkck
1
E0M1
=
1 X
k=1
!k
E0R0;1 [ck]
R0;1 [1]
=
1 X
k=1
!kE0Re
0;1 [ck];
with weights
!k =
E0Mkck P1
k=1 E0Mkck
:
34